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COMMENTS
527s: The New Frontier for Election Law and
Associational Rights
The media widely reported the 2004 Election as the most divisive
in recent history.1 Just as acrimonious partisan campaigning has long
been a hallmark of American politics, so has the struggle over campaign
financing, especially with regard to corporations, unions, and, most
recently, wealthy individuals.2 Congress's first attempt to address con-
cerns related to campaign contributions by corporations was the Tillman
Act of 1907. After many subsequent statutes that sought to tweak the
original act and to include regulation of other influential contributors,
such as labor organizations,4 Congress enacted the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).' The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002 (BCRA),6 Congress's most recent attempt to limit what it sees
as the corrupting effect of campaign contributions from various parties,
was recently examined and largely upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.7
BCRA sought to curtail perceived soft-money8 loopholes that had been
1. See, e.g., CNN Wolf Blitzer Reports (CNN television broadcast Oct. 8, 2004) (describing
the 2004 campaign as "one of the most bitterly divisive campaigns in recent memory") (transcript
on file with the University of Miami Law Review); CBS Morning News (CBS television broadcast
Nov. 2, 2004) (describing the 2004 campaign as "one of the most divisive and expensive
presidential campaigns in recent memory") (transcript on file with the University of Miami Law
Review).
2. See FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208-10 (1982) (reviewing history
of regulation of financial contributions to federal candidates by corporations and labor unions);
The Center for Responsive Politics, Top Individual Contributors to 527 Committees 2004 Election
Cycle, http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527indivs.asp?cycle=2004 (last visited Nov. 13, 2005)
(showing that approximately $146 million was spent by the top 25 contributors to 527s based on
the Center's compilation of Internal Revenue Service records released January 11, 2005); The
Center for Public Integrity, 527s in 2004 Shatter Previous Records for Political Fundraising (Dec.
16, 2004), http://www.publicintegrity.org/527/report.aspx?aid=435 (showing that approximately
$126 million was spent by the top 15 individual donors to 527s in the 2004 election cycle based
on the Center's analysis of Internal Revenue Service reports).
3. Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000)).
4. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 114-22 (2003) and its predecessors for a more
detailed discussion of the historical campaign finance laws that led up to the enactment of BCRA.
5. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 18,
and 47 U.S.C.).
6. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
7. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93.
8. Id. at 123 ("[P]rior to the enactment of BCRA, federal law permitted corporations and
unions, as well as individuals who had already made the maximum permissible contributions to
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left open by FECA, or, as some critics claim, the Federal Election Com-
mission's (FEC) interpretation of FECA.9 Nevertheless, BCRA still did
not directly or conclusively address the increasingly significant impact
of 527 organizations.
527s exist at the "intersection" of tax law and campaign finance
law.1° For this reason, the actions undertaken by 527s are difficult to
categorize and do not attract the attention they deserve from the average
voter. The importance of these organizations, and the common and stat-
utory law that attempt to circumscribe their impact on federal elections,
cannot be underestimated. The restrictions imposed during federal cam-
paigns on constitutional principles embodied in the First Amendment, as
well as the Supreme Court's and Congress's justifications for these
restrictions, are quite controversial.
With a focus on First Amendment associational rights, section I of
this article will introduce the "new" 527s (section 527 of the Internal
Revenue Code has existed since 1974, but has undergone several impor-
tant changes since the mid-1990's)," and describe why they have
received so much media attention,' 2 despite the public's general igno-
rance of their characteristics. The next section will briefly discuss
McConnell v. FEC"3 and predecessor cases in connection with testimony
regarding proposed rulemaking by the FEC to regulate 527s. A further
discussion of McConnell and related cases will comprise the following
section, which will analyze the scarce, yet convoluted, history of the
associational rights of political organizations such as 527s. The final
section, which contains the primary analytical portion of this article, will
examine predictions on the future role of 527s, and what proposed and
recent changes to the laws and regulations in this area might mean for
federal candidates, to contribute 'nonfederal money'-also known as 'soft money'-to political
parties for activities intended to influence state or local elections.").
9. See 527 Reform Act of 2005: Hearing to Examine and Discuss S. 271 Before the S.
Comm. on Rules and Administration, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter 527 Hearing] (statement of
Sen. John McCain), available at http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2005/030805_hearing.htm ("S.
271 ...is straightforward legislation to overcome the FEC's failure to properly interpret the
original Federal Election Campaign Act.").
10. Id. (statement of Professor Frances R. Hill) ("Section 527 organizations exist at the point
where the Internal Revenue Code ... intersects FECA.").
11. See Frances R. Hill, Probing the Limits of Section 527 to Design a New Campaign
Finance Vehicle, 86 TAx NoTEs 387 (2000).
12. See, e.g., John McCormick, With a 527, Little Guys Can Behave Just Like Big Spenders;
Fed-up Neighbors Make Anti-Bush Ad, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 18, 2004, at 15; Thomas B. Edsall, After
Late Start, Republican Groups Jump Into the Lead; Since August, 527s Raised Six Times as Much
as Democrats, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2004, at A15; Glen Justice & Kate Zemike, '527' Groups
Still at Work Raising Millions for Ads, N.Y. TnMEs, Oct. 16, 2004, at A5.
13. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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alternative forms of campaign financing, the pursuit of campaign finance
reform goals, and their impact on associational rights.
I. THE NEW 527s
Under section 527, the Internal Revenue Code provides income tax
exemption for political organizations that engage in certain "exempt
functions."' 4 These exempt functions are defined as "influencing or
attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appoint-
ment of any individual" to any public office or office in a political
organization. "
Various campaign finance analysts, including former FEC insiders,
have argued that because 527s are self-defined political organizations
whose goal is to influence elections, those that specifically target federal
elections should be required to adhere to the registration, reporting, and
contribution limits that restrain the use of soft money under FECA. 16
Proponents of this argument use FECA's definition of a political com-
mittee,' 7 and its related definitions for contributions' 8 and expendi-
tures,19 to bolster their position. On the other side of the controversy are
those who do not see any reason to automatically treat 527 organizations
differently than other nonprofits based on the definition of their activi-
ties under the Internal Revenue Code.2 ° The two sides have thus framed
the debate around the proper relationship between the two statutes. In
14. See I.R.C. § 527 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
15. Id. § 527(e)(2) (2000).
16. See, e.g., Political Comm. Status Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Public Hearing on 11
CFR Parts 100, 102, 104, 106, and 114 Before the FEC (Apr. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Public
Hearing] (statements of Lawrence Noble, Executive Director, Center for Responsive Politics,
former FEC General Counsel, and Trevor Potter, Chair and General Counsel, Campaign Legal
Center, former FEC Comm'r), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/political-commstatus/
trans_04_15 04.pdf.
17. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (2000) ("The term 'political committee' means ... any committee,
club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions aggregating in excess of
$1,000 during a calendar year or which makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000
during a calendar year.").
18. Id. § 431(8)(A)(i) ("The term 'contribution' includes . . . any gift, subscription, loan,
advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of
influencing any election for Federal office." (emphasis added)).
19. Id. § 431(9)(A)(i) ("The term 'expenditure' includes . . . any purchase, payment,
distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by any personfor
the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." (emphasis added)).
20. See, e.g., Public Hearing, supra note 16 (statement of Jim Bopp of Bopp, Coleson &
Bostrom, on behalf of Focus on the Family, the National Right to Life Committee, and other
groups). In fact, in the final regulations issued by the FEC on November 23, 2004 and effective
January 1, 2005, it adopted rules that apply "without regard to tax status, so they reach all FECA
'persons,' including, for example, entities described in or operating under section 501(c)(3),
501(c)(4), and 527 of the Internal Revenue Code." Political Committee Status, Definition of
Contribution, and Allocation for Separate Segregated Funds and Nonconnected Committees,
2006]
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other words, should the FEC look to their tax-exempt status in catego-
rizing 527s, thereby treating them in the same manner as other 501(c)
organizations 21 that are not currently regulated? Or, should the FEC
look to the activities that provide the basis for 527's tax-exempt status,
thereby perhaps requiring the regulation of these organizations? Con-
gress delegated this difficult analytical choice to the FEC;22 however,
some legislators are quite unhappy with the FEC's recent decisions and
therefore have introduced legislation to mandate regulation of 527s as
political committees.23
It is also important to point out those changes to section 527 that
require disclosures regarding contributions to these organizations.24
527s must file with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) several reports
detailing the amount, date, and purpose of all large expenditures as well
as the name, address, occupation, and employer of all large contribu-
tors. In fact, it is this very information that allows advocates of stricter
regulation to monitor, track, and report on the contributions and expend-
itures of 527s.
While these disclosures provide important information, many pro-
ponents of stricter regulation believe that IRS regulation is insufficient
because it fails to restrict the large impact of soft money on the federal
campaign landscape.2 6  According to two organizations that advocate
changes to the current regulations, over $500 million was raised and
spent by 527s during the 2004 election cycles (of which almost half
represented spending by committees involved with presidential election
races), resulting in almost double the amount raised and expended in
Funds Received in Response to Solicitations, 69 Fed. Reg. 68,056 (Nov. 23, 2004) (codified at 11
C.F.R. pts. 100, 102, 104, and 106).
21. 501(c) organizations are named for their section in the Internal Revenue Code and are
organizations that are exempt from taxation. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2005).
22. As noted by FEC Commissioner Thomas during the oversight hearing, the FEC has been
authorized by Congress "to make, amend, and repeal such rules" as are necessary to carry out the
campaign finance laws enacted by Congress. See Public Hearing, supra note 16 (statement of
Scott Thomas, FEC Comm'r). Because Congress did not specifically include 527s in their
definition of political committees, it is up to the FEC to regulate 527s as political committees
through its rule making powers, which was the subject of the public hearing.
23. See 527 Reform Act of 2005, S. 271, 109th Cong. (2005).
24. For an interesting discussion on the legislative history of amendments to section 527 as
well as the forecasted and intended effects of the amendments, see David D. Storey, Note, The
Amendment of Section 527: Eliminating Stealth PACs and Providing a Model for Future
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 IND. L.J. 167 (2002).
25. I.R.C. § 5270) (2000).
26. See, e.g., 527 Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Scott Thomas, FEC Comm'r)
(addressing the argument against a proposal by Commissioners Thomas and Toner for the FEC to
regulate 527s that Congress already enacted disclosure requirements for and stating that the
enactment of additional regulation would be "to reject a clear congressional judgment").
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2002.27
Furthermore, these same reform advocates espouse the view that
the FEC has failed in its obligation to reign in 527 organizations that
have clearly violated the campaign finance laws, and has cleared the
way for yet more circumvention.28 In fact, one reform advocate has
characterized this kind of circumvention as "statutory arbitrage," in that
these organizations planned their way into tax-exempt status by claiming
their organizations were political in nature, and then opposed classifica-
tion as political committees to avoid regulation under FECA. 29 There is
even evidence that the Supreme Court agrees with the argument that
some 527s have already become, and will increasingly be, used as soft-
money loopholes.3"
II. MCCONNELL AND FEC RULEMAKING
Both sides of the 527-classification debate have focused on the
strong rhetoric the majority in McConnell employed to uphold the chal-
lenged provisions of BCRA. Those who support classification of 527s
as political committees view the Court's language as authoritative on the
issue, while those who oppose such treatment regard this language as
dicta.
27. The Center for Responsive Politics, 527 Committee Activity: Expenditure Breakdown -
Federally Focused Organizations, http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtes.asp?level=E&
cycle=2004 (last visited Nov. 13, 2005); The Center for Public Integrity, supra note 2. Although
there seems to be some inconsistency between the dollar amounts reported by each organization,
this may be explained by the different dates at which each performed its analysis (December 16,
2004 versus January 11, 2005).
28. Public Hearing, supra note 16 (statement of Larry Noble) ("Do not let the soft money
history repeat itself. It is in danger of repeating itself on a much quicker time frame than we've
ever seen before. I think there was the general feeling the FEC was not doing what it needed to do
.... "); Id. (statement of Trevor Potter) ("So I think it's important that the Commission deal with
this matter at this time, not wait and prove itself unable to deal with it, run the risk that the other
side of the political equation will use that as a justification to go forward itself, and then be faced
yet again with a circumstance where the political reality has moved past you and it will be difficult
to deal with any of this after the election. So for all those reasons, I do urge the Commission to
proceed with the 527 side of this in an expeditious manner.").
29. 527 Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Professor Frances R. Hill).
30. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 176-77 (2003). In upholding the BCRA changes to
FECA that prohibit party committees from donating to 527s and other nonprofits, the majority
observed:
Parties and candidates have also begun to take advantage of so-called "politician
527s," which are little more than soft-money fronts for the promotion of particular
federal officeholders and their interests .... These 527s have been quite successful
at raising substantial sums of soft money from corporate interests, as well as from
the national parties themselves. Given BCRA's tighter restrictions on the raising
and spending of soft money, the incentives for parties to exploit such organizations
will only increase.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Specifically, supporters of the proposed FEC rulemaking assert a
connection between the line of cases from Buckley v. Valeo3' and FEC
v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL)3 2 to McConnell. In not-
ing the McConnell Court's statement that "actions taken by political par-
ties are presumed to be in connection with election campaigns,"33 FEC
Commissioner Michael E. Toner stated: "We believe-Commissioner
Thomas and I do-that political parties and other campaign organiza-
tions and 527 groups have many of the same characteristics [as political
parties]."34 On the other hand, opponents of the change narrowly con-
strue the Court's language as only applying to political parties and can-
didates.35  This argument could also be supported by the line of cases
from Buckley36 and FEC v. National Right to Work Committee37 to
McConnell.38 Specifically, Bradley A. Smith, the Chairman of the FEC,
has said that "[t]he Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC [ ] explicitly
recognized that Congress could treat some groups differently from
others without running afoul of constitutional equal protection guaran-
31. 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976) (The term "political committee . . . need only encompass
organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the
nomination or election of a candidate.").
32. 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986) ("[S]hould MCFL's independent spending become so extensive
that the organization's major purpose may be regarded as campaign activity, the corporation
would be classified as a political committee. As such, it would automatically be subject to the
obligations and restrictions applicable to those groups whose primary objective is to influence
political campaigns." (citation omitted)).
33. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n.6.
34. The Fed. Election Commission: Oversight Hearing Before the H. Commission on H.
Administration, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (statement of Michael E.
Toner, FEC Comm'r), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?EPaddress=
162.140.64.52&filename=94496.pdf&directory=/disk2/wais/data/108_house hearings.
35. See, e.g., id. (statement of Bradley A. Smith, FEC Chairman) (quoting the McConnell
Court's presumption, and stating: "[D]espite the apparent breadth of this pronouncement, its scope
is limited. The Court did not address the phrase ['promote, support, attack or oppose'] as applied
to non-party committees with complex policy agendas-that issue wasn't before the Court, since
BCRA itself does not apply the standard to non-party committees.").
36. See 424 U.S. at 80 ("But when the maker of the expenditure is not within these
categories-when it is an individual other than a candidate or a group other than a 'political
committee'-the relation of the information sought to the purposes of the Act may be too remote.
To insure that the reach ... is not impermissibly broad, we construe 'expenditure' . . . to reach
only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate.").
37. See 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982) ("[T]he 'differing structures and purposes' of different
entities 'may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral
process."' (quoting Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981))).
38. See 540 U.S. at 188 ("More importantly, however, Congress is fully entitled to consider
the real-world differences between political parties and interest groups when crafting a system of
campaign finance regulation. Interest groups do not select slates of candidates for elections.
Interest groups do not determine who will serve on legislative committees, elect congressional
leadership, or organize legislative caucuses. Political parties have influence and power in the
legislature that vastly exceeds that of any interest group.").
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tees. In so doing, it recognized that independent groups would remain
free from restrictions placed upon parties."39
The rules eventually adopted by the FEC represent a compromise
between these divergent arguments and interpretations of relevant case
law. For one, there was compromise in the effective date of the new
rules-it was too late for the rules to affect the 2004 elections, but the
rules will affect the 2006 elections, as they came into effect January 1,
2005.40 Also, the rules will subject certain 527s to FECA regulations if
they receive contributions in response to a communication that "plainly
seeks funds 'for the purpose of influencing Federal elections.' "41 Nev-
ertheless, these new rules will apply "without regard to tax status, so
they reach all FECA 'persons,' including, for example, entities described
in or operating under section 501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), and 527 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code."42 Finally, the Commission rejected proposals to
define the term "expenditure" to include communications that promote,
attack, support, or oppose any candidate for federal candidate or that
promote or oppose any political party, specifically when made by 527
organizations or organizations that meet Buckley's "major purpose"
test.
43
Given FEC Chairman Smith's testimony regarding his view that the
FEC must defer to Congress on the issue of defining expenditures,44 and
Senator McCain's view that the FEC is so ineffective that it must be
replaced, as well as his introduction of legislation to require 527s to
register as political committees,45 it is no surprise that the current status
of 527s is being challenged yet again by the 527 Reform Act of 2005.46
39. Oversight Hearing, supra note 34 (statement of Bradley A. Smith, FEC Chairman).
However, this language from McConnell could also be used to support the view that 527s should
be treated differently from 501(c) organizations, and that in fact, 527s should be classified as
political committees. Public Hearing, supra note 16 (statement of Larry Noble) ("[T]he FEC
must recognize that using different standards under FECA for determining when 527 and 501(c)
organizations become political committees is mandated by the Supreme Court's resolution of the
tension between the congressional intent evidenced by the plain words of FECA and constitutional
concerns.").
40. Political Committee Status, Definition of Contribution, and Allocation for Separate
Segregated Funds and Nonconnected Committees, Funds Received in Response to Solicitations,
69 Fed. Reg. 68,056 (Nov. 23, 2004) (to be codified at II C.F.R. pts. 100, 102, 104, and 106).
41. Id. at 68,057.
42. Id. at 68,056.
43. Id. at 68,065.
44. Oversight Hearing, supra note 34 (statement of Bradley A. Smith, FEC Chairman).
45. John McCain, Paying for Campaigns: McCain Eyes Next Target, USA TODAY, Nov. 4,
2004, at 27A.
46. S. 271, 109th Cong. (2005).
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III. THE HISTORY OF ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS OF
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
The Court in McConnell reiterated that although First Amendment
associational rights are important and deserving of protection, they are
not absolute.47 Associational rights may be infringed upon if the restric-
tion is "closely drawn" to the government's objective.48 Moreover, the
level of scrutiny that a court must apply in considering the validity of the
restriction may vary depending on whether contributions or expenditures
are restricted.4 9
A complicating factor in evaluating the associational rights of polit-
ical organizations is the question of where a group's rights originate.
Are the protected associational rights only those of the individuals who
contribute to the organization? Or does the organization itself possess
associational rights independent of its individual members' rights?
One of the earliest cases to address the interaction between individ-
ual and organizational associational rights is Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire,"o in which the Court announced that "[a]ny interference with the
freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of
its adherents.""1  This statement implies that organizations do have
rights separate and distinct from the rights of their members and that the
organization's rights are worthy of First Amendment protection.
In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,5 2 the Supreme Court
struck down a law compelling disclosure of a group's members as vio-
lating the right of association, and enunciated a clear standard of review
for government regulation of the right: "Of course, it is immaterial
whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to polit-
ical, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which may
have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the
closest scrutiny."53 The Court noted that its decision was protective of
both the individual rights of those associated with the NAACP54 and of
47. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 171 (2003) ("We recognize, as we have in the past,
the importance of preserving the associational freedom of parties. But not every minor restriction
on parties' otherwise unrestrained ability to associate is of constitutional dimension.").
48. See id. at 136 ("Thus, a contribution limit involving even 'significant interference' with
associational rights is nevertheless valid if it satisfies the 'lesser demand' of being 'closely drawn'
to match a 'sufficiently important interest.'") (citations omitted).
49. See id. at 134.
50. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
51. Id. at 250.
52. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
53. Id. at 460-61.
54. Id. at 459 ("If petitioner's rank-and-file members are constitutionally entitled to withhold
their connection with the Association despite the production order, it is manifest that this right is
properly assertable by the Association.").
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the association itself. The association has rights because it is "in every
practical sense identical" to its members and because it would likely be
adversely affected by any violation of its members' associational
rights." Because of these factors, the Court found that the NAACP had
standing to protest the violation on behalf of its members.56
Buckley reiterated the original basis for the protection of a group's
associational rights: the ability to "effectively amplify[ I] the voice of
their adherents."57 The Court concluded that this associational right was
infringed by FECA's independent expenditure limitations.58 However,
the Court also went on to distinguish this associational right from the
organization's right to aggregate large sums of money to promote effec-
tive advocacy and, importantly, an individual member's right to associ-
ate with a candidate or committee, both rights which were infringed
upon by FECA's contribution limits.5 9 In this way, Buckley not only
introduced the concept that groups may have an additional layer of asso-
ciational rights above individual rights, but it also established a dichot-
omy with respect to associational rights: the distinction between
contribution limits and independent expenditure limits, which continued
in subsequent cases right through McConnell (with the possible excep-
tion of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
6 ° discussed below). 6 1
A further refinement on the theory of group associational rights
came with MCFL, when a plurality of the Supreme Court sought to jus-
tify why certain organizations deserved greater protection of their asso-
ciational rights than others.62 By reasoning that certain nonprofit
corporations do not pose the same threat as for-profit corporations, the
plurality reached the conclusion that the use of the corporate form by
55. Id.
56. Id. at 460.
57. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (citing Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460).
58. Id. Independent expenditures are defined as expenditures "by a person (A) expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and (B) that is not made in
concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate's
authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents." 2
U.S.C. § 431(17) (2000).
59. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22.
60. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
61. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387 (2000) ("We flagged a
similar difference between expenditure and contribution limitations in their impacts on the
association right."); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 221 (2003) ("We repeatedly have struck
down limitations on expenditures ...on the ground that such limitations 'impose far greater
restraints on the freedom of speech and association' than do limits on contributions and
coordinated expenditures."). Buckley arguably created a tripartite standard perpetuated in
McConnell by further distinguishing between coordinated expenditures (treated as indirect
contributions) and expenditures "made totally independently of the candidate and his campaign."
See id.
62. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 254-55 (1986) (plurality opinion).
2006]
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itself should not trigger the deferential standard enunciated in National
Right to Work.6 3 Instead, the legislature should consider the underlying
purpose of the organization when evaluating the potential for corruption
in expending money during political campaigns.64
Just a few years later, the Court adopted an even more nuanced
approach to corporate associational rights in Austin. The majority char-
acterized its opinion in MCFL by limiting it to the following phrase: "In
MCFL, we held that the nonprofit organization there had 'features more
akin to voluntary political associations than business firms, and therefore
should not have to bear burdens on independent spending solely because
of [its] incorporated status.' "65 The Court went on to both reiterate and
broaden the three distinct characteristics of an MCFL-type entity: its for-
mation for a political purpose and a narrow political focus that precludes
engaging in business activities; the absence of shareholders, who are
replaced by members who have "no economic disincentive for disassoci-
ating . . . if they disagree with [the organization's] political activity";
and the organization's "independence from the influence of business
corporations. 66 By distinguishing the Chamber of Commerce from an
MCFL-type entity, the majority found a state campaign finance law,
which prohibited the use of general treasury funds for independent
expenditures, to be constitutional as applied to a nonprofit
organization.67
The primary significance of Austin is the Court's distinction of the
two entities by looking through the organization to the associational
rights of the individual members in considering whether the members
have an economic disincentive for disassociating from the organization:
"Although the Chamber also lacks shareholders, many of its members
may be similarly reluctant to withdraw as members even if they disagree
with the Chamber's political expression, because they wish to benefit
from the Chamber's nonpolitical programs and to establish contacts with
other members of the business community."68 This rationale would
63. See id. at 259; FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982) (accepting
Congress's reasoning for regulating all corporations and labor unions, without regard to their
financial resources, and not wanting to "second-guess" the legislature's response to the perceived
threat of corruption).
64. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 259 ("Regulation of corporate political activity thus has reflected
concern not about use of the corporate form per se, but about the potential for unfair deployment
of wealth for political purposes. Groups such as MCFL do not pose that danger of corruption.
MCFL was formed to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital. The resources it has
available are not a function of its success in the economic marketplace, but its popularity in the
political marketplace." (footnote omitted)).
65. Austin, 494 U.S. at 661 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263).
66. Id. at 662-64.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 663.
[Vol. 60:261
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seem to support the premise that the individual members' associational
rights are superior to those of the organization.
The dissenting opinions in the case, however, are worthy of discus-
sion. Three Justices argued strenuously that the majority departed from
the expenditure/contribution distinction first enunciated in Buckley.69
This is significant because the basis of the distinction was grounded in
the greater infringement on associational rights resulting from restric-
tions on independent expenditures.70 The dissenting Justices also
rejected the majority's rationale that state-conferred advantages of incor-
poration make it unfair for these organizations to benefit from these
advantages and at the same time attempt to influence the political pro-
cess.7 ' In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia further explained
that acceptance of "special advantages," including tax breaks, does not
come at the expense of First Amendment Rights.72
For the most part, the cases discussed cite the prevention of corrup-
tion or the appearance of corruption of political candidates by large con-
tributors as the rationale for restricting contributions and independent
expenditures. Beginning with Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC,73 the Court acknowledged a separate, albeit related, aim of
"democratiz[ing] the influence" of money on elections." This trend
continues through McConnell, which has perhaps been the Court's most
successful attempt at articulating a theory of American democracy and
electoral politics.
In the same year that Nixon was handed down, the Court endeav-
ored again to protect the associational rights of organizations. In Cali-
fornia Democratic Party v. Jones,75 Justice Scalia announced that the
"forced association" under California's Proposition 19876 would likely
have the intended outcome of changing a political party's message, and
that the majority could "think of no heavier burden on a political party's
associational freedom."77
69. See id.
70. Id. at 702-03 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 711-12.
72. Id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the price
of those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment rights.").
73. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
74. Id. at 401 ("Moreover, by limiting the size of the largest contributions, such restrictions
aim to democratize the influence that money itself may bring to bear upon the electoral
process .... [The statute] permits all supporters to contribute the same amount of money, in an
attempt to make the process fairer and more democratic." (citations omitted)).
75. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
76. Proposition 198 sought to allow all registered voters, including those not registered for a
specific political party, to vote for any candidate in a political party's primary regardless of that
candidate's political affiliation. See id. at 570.
77. Id. at 581-82.
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Another case preceding McConnell, FEC v. Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado 11)78 is also of importance to
this brief historical review. In a footnote in Colorado II, the Court used
a long string cite to try to describe the relationship between individual
and organizational associational rights, but ultimately concluded that the
issue is unsettled, and refused to consider the issue in the case at bar.79
Just as the Court in Jones ostensibly established some protection
for a group's associational rights, the McConnell Court sought to intro-
duce limits on those rights. The Court sought to achieve this objective
by downplaying the importance of such rights,8 ° and by applying the
narrowest possible reading of Buckley with respect to those rights.8
IV. WHERE Do 527s FIT IN?
Applying the "closest scrutiny" standard enunciated in Patterson to
proposed regulation of 527s entails an examination of the evidence that
is available to support the theory that large contributions to these organi-
zations cause corruption of federal political candidates. On the one
hand, expenditures by 527s can be seen as totally independent from the
candidates and their political parties, thereby triggering protection under
the Buckley independent expenditure standard.82  On the other hand,
except for the argument that huge contributions to 527s, like those seen
in the 2004 election cycle, do in fact raise the specter of corruption,
there may be some evidence that 527s do indeed coordinate with federal
candidates. Nonetheless, there is other data to support Buckley protec-
78. 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
79. See id. at 448 n. 10 ("We have repeatedly held that political parties and other associations
derive rights from their members. While some commentators have assumed that associations'
rights are also limited to the rights of the individuals who belong to them, that view has been
subject to debate. There is some language in our cases supporting the position that parties' rights
are more than the sum of their members' rights, but we have never settled upon the nature of any
such difference and have no reason to do so here." (citations omitted)).
80. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 171-72 (2003) ("We recognize ... the importance of
preserving the associational freedom of parties. But not every minor restriction on parties'
otherwise unrestrained ability to associate is of constitutional dimension." (citations omitted)).
81. See id. at 182 ("Even on the narrowest reading of Buckley, a regulation restricting
donations to a federal candidate . . . qualifies as a contribution limit subject to less rigorous
scrutiny. Such donations have only marginal speech and associational value, but at the same time
pose a substantial threat of corruption.").
82. See Richard L. Hasen, Op-Ed., A GOP Flip-Flop on Political Ads, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2004, at M5 ("The 527s do not coordinate with candidates or parties. Unlike the political parties,
527s are not selling access to elected officials in exchange for large donations. Under the
Supreme Court cases that say one cannot limit spending on campaigns independent of candidates,
it is hard to see how contributions to these groups could constitutionally be regulated .... The
court has refused to acknowledge that independent spending can lead to corruption or its
appearance, and it has explicitly rejected the idea of leveling the playing field as a strong enough
interest to justify restrictions on 1st Amendment freedoms.").
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tion under the Court's rationale that "[u]nlike contributions, such inde-
pendent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the
candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive." 3 It
therefore remains to be seen whether the expenditures by 527s are truly
independent and uncoordinated.
Also, 527s may meet the requirements for protection of the associa-
tional rights of MCFL-type entities.84 As to the first characteristic, 527s
are clearly political organizations that do not otherwise engage in busi-
ness activities and whose contributors "are fully aware of [their] political
purposes, and in fact contribute precisely because they support those
purposes. 85 The second characteristic is also easily met because 527s
do not have shareholders with a claim on assets or earnings or members
that would suffer a disadvantage for disassociating.86 The final factor is
less clear-while 527s are not established as business corporations or
labor unions, they do not always have a policy of refusing contributions
from those organizations.8 7 While the negative attention 527s have gar-
nered results mostly from large individual donations that dwarf the cor-
porate donations, it is unclear whether corporate contributions, which
many analysts expect will increase in the future, will turn 527s into the
"conduits for the type of direct spending that creates a threat to the polit-
ical marketplace."8 The key to deciding this factor therefore lies in
whether a court would find that 527s circumvent existing election laws
designed to prevent the corrupting influence of these types of donations.
The Court in MCFL held that classifying the nonprofit groups that
met its three requirements as political committees under FECA (the
same action proposed by proponents of 527 reform) was overly burden-
some and was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the stated com-
pelling government interest of preventing "massive undisclosed political
spending by similar entities, and [ ] their use as conduits for undisclosed
spending by business corporations and unions."89 Given the disclosure
83. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976); see also Fox Special Report with Brit Hume:
The All Star Panel (Fox News television broadcast Aug. 5, 2004) (discussing impact of Swift Boat
Veterans for Truth ads, Mort Kondracke commented: "I mean it's ironic that among these 527s,
finally a 527 pops up that's helping, supposedly, helping Bush. And it's doing him more harm
than good.").
84. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
85. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260-61 (1986).
86. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 662-64 (1990).
87. See id.
88. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264; see also The Center for Public Integrity, supra note 2 (showing
that the top 527 corporate donor gave approximately $4 million, while the top individual donor
gave $23.7 million. The top fifteen 527 corporate donors gave a total of approximately $21
million in comparison with approximately $126 million (6 times the corporate amount) for the top
15 individual donors).
89. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 262.
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requirements that are now in place for 527s,90 however, there is a strong
argument that the "state interest in disclosure" has already been met "in
a manner less restrictive than imposing the full panoply of regulations
that accompany status as a political committee under [FECA]." 9' Nev-
ertheless, opponents argue that these disclosure requirements still may
not adequately address the government's interest in preventing circum-
vention of campaign finance laws.
92
The greatest obstacle to the application of the MCFL standard to
527s comes from the Court's somewhat careless reference to Buckley's
major purpose test:
Furthermore, should MCFL's independent spending become so
extensive that the organization's major purpose may be regarded as
campaign activity, the corporation would be classified as a political
committee. As such, it would automatically be subject to the obliga-
tions and restrictions applicable to those groups whose primary
objective is to influence political campaigns. In sum, there is no need
for the sake of disclosure to treat MCFL any differently than other
organizations that only occasionally engage in independent spending
on behalf of candidates.93
As many have persuasively argued, the major purpose of 527s, by defi-
nition, is campaign activity, and they engage far more than occasionally
in spending on behalf of candidates. The argument still remains, how-
ever, that 527s have features "more akin to voluntary political associa-
tions than business firms,"94 even though there may be reasons to
impose "burdens on independent spending" 95 aside from their incorpo-
rated status.
Furthermore, the Court in Austin demonstrated that it was willing to
disregard the distinction between contributions and expenditures when
applied to nonprofit corporations that did not meet the strict require-
ments of MCFL. In comparing the Michigan Chamber of Commerce to
527s, it is possible that 527s would fail the MCFL test on the third char-
acteristic (independence from influence of business corporations) based
on the Court's anti-circumvention rationale:
Business corporations ... could circumvent the Act's restriction by
funneling money through the Chamber's general treasury. Because
the Chamber accepts money from for-profit corporations, it could,
absent application of [Michigan campaign finance law] serve as a
90. See I.R.C. § 527(j) (2000).
91. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 262.
92. See 527 Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Scott Thomas, FEC Comm'r).
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conduit for corporate political spending. In sum, the Chamber does
not possess the features that would compel the State to exempt it
from restriction on independent political expenditures.96
Further complicating the discussion over how to properly classify
527s is that the immense attention paid to 527s is largely attributable to
the significant sums that poured into negative attack ads, including
"sham issue ads"97 before and during the 2004 presidential race. Advo-
cates for change have emphasized that political parties and candidates-
not "unaccountable" 527s-should dictate the issues discussed in fed-
eral elections.98 If one of the main reasons for limiting large individual
contributions to 527s is to change, restrict, or even shut down the
messages these negative ads convey, then the associational rights of
527s and their members (upheld in cases like Patterson,9 9 Buckley,'00
First National Bank v. Bellotti,'° ' and Jones'02 ) are potentially being
violated.
McConnell recognized that restricting negative attack ads achieves
the legitimate government interest in anti-circumvention of campaign
finance laws restricting contributions. 0 3 When applying McConnell to
96. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 664-65 (1990) (footnote omitted).
97. As one Senate report described them, sham issue ads are "candidate advertisements
masquerading as issue ads." McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 132 (2003). One example of an
Internet ad run during the 2004 election cycle was by a small 527. The ad shows, among other
things, Osama bin Laden "making a fictitious endorsement of President Bush." See McCormick,
supra note 12.
98. See 527 Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Sen. Trent Lott) ("We've shifted power from
the political parties to shadowy 527s who are now setting the agenda for this country's electoral
process. This is fundamentally wrong. The ones who should be setting the issue agenda are
candidates and the political parties they represent.").
99. NAACP v. Ala. ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) ("Effective advocacy of
both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by
group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus
between the freedoms of speech and assembly .... [A]nd state action which may have the effect
of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny." (citations omitted)).
100. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) ("[FECA's] $1,000 limitation on independent
expenditures 'relative to a clearly identified candidate' precludes most associations from
effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents, the original basis for the recognition of First
Amendment protection of the freedom of association.").
101. 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) (discussing corporate advertising used to oppose a State
referendum, as opposed to candidates for political office, and stating: "[T]he fact that advocacy
may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it: The Constitution 'protects expression
which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing."' (quoting Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959))).
102. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 581-82 (2000) ("Such forced association
has the likely outcome-indeed, in this case, the intended outcome-of changing the parties'
message. We can think of no heavier burden on a political party's associational freedom."
(emphasis added)).
103. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 185 (2003) ("The . . . argument, that soft-money
contributions . . . for 'public communications' do not corrupt or appear to corrupt federal
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527s, however, it is difficult to argue that the Supreme Court definitively
provided a basis for finding an anti-corruption, anti-circumvention, or
participatory self-governance rationale for classifying 527s as political
committees in an effort to limit individual contributions. The evidence
that the complainants in McConnell and supporters of classifying 527s
as political committees cite does not explicitly implicate a corruption
link between 527s and political candidates. Rather, that evidence simply
reiterates the point that 527s are effective at utilizing ads to influence the
electorate. 1'
It is also remarkable that the plaintiffs in McConnell characterized
527s as interest groups; the Supreme Court had no trouble distinguishing
interest groups from political parties, effectively justifying the lack of
soft-money restrictions on interest groups.1 05 Furthermore, if conclusive
evidence were provided to show that 527s truly operate independently
from candidates and that their advertising campaigns may even have the
effect of harming a given political candidate, then the Supreme Court
would likely afford Buckley protection to such independent expenditures
by 527s.106
On the other hand, while the issue was not squarely before the
Court in McConnell, the majority demonstrated its disdain for "politi-
cian 527s" in dicta. 10 7 Reform advocates have also made persuasive
arguments as to how circumvention might be achieved by 527s.108 Fur-
thermore, the Court has already sanctioned the anti-circumvention mea-
candidates, ignores . .. Congress' strong interest in preventing circumvention of otherwise valid
contribution limits. The proliferation of sham issue ads has driven the soft-money explosion.").
104. See Declaration of Raymond J. La Raja, Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, Civ. No. 02-
874 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2002), affid in part, rev'd in part sub nom. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93
(2003) (citing Professor David Magleby's study).
105. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 188 ("More importantly, however, Congress is fully entitled to
consider the real-world differences between political parties and interest groups when crafting a
system of campaign finance regulation. Interest groups do not select slates of candidates for
elections. Interest groups do not determine who will serve on legislative committees, elect
congressional leadership, or organize legislative caucuses. Political parties have influence and
power in the legislature that vastly exceeds that of any interest group." (citations omitted)).
106. See id. at 221 ("[T]he rationale for affording special protection to wholly independent
expenditures has nothing to do with the absence of an agreement and everything to do with the
functional consequences of different types of expenditures. Independent expenditures 'are poor
sources of leverage for a spender because they might be duplicative or counterproductive from a
candidate's point of view.'").
107. See, e.g., id. at 176-77 ("Parties and candidates have also begun to take advantage of so-
called 'politician 527s,' which are little more than soft-money fronts for the promotion of
particular federal officeholders and their interests. These 527s have been quite successful at
raising substantial sums of soft money from corporate interests, as well as from the national
parties themselves. Given BCRA's tighter restrictions on the raising and spending of soft money,
the incentives for parties to exploit such organizations will only increase." (citations omitted)).
108. See 527 Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Michael J. Malbin, Exec. Director,
Campaign Finance Institute).
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sure of limits on soft-money contributions to 527s and other tax-exempt
organizations from political party committees. 9 Finally, as some cam-
paign finance reform analysts have observed, both the amount of evi-
dence needed to meet the burden of proof for showing corruption or its
appearance, as well as the level of scrutiny applied to campaign finance
regulations, has steadily decreased over the years, resulting in an almost
completely deferential approach to congressional judgments. 10
V. THE 527 REFORM ACT OF 2005"'
Legislation recently introduced by Senator McCain and others pro-
poses to treat all 527 organizations as political committees under FECA,
with a few exceptions. The exceptions are 501(c) nonprofits that expend
funds for "exempt functions" under section 527 (the so-called "embed-
ded 527s" that are also exempt from reporting requirements under
527(f)(1) and 527(i)(5)); 527s that have gross receipts of less than
$25,000 or more for any taxable year; state and local political party
committees and political party committees of state and local candi-
dates;' 527s organized solely to pay for deductible business expenses
under section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code;" 3 527s organized
solely for newsletter funds;' and 527s organized solely to influence
non-federal elections, unless they spend more than $1,000 on "[a] public
communication that promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes [the so-
called "PASO Standard"] a clearly identified candidate for Federal
office during the 1-year period ending on the date of the general election
for the office sought by the clearly identified candidate occurs [sic]" or
for voter drive activity described in section 325(d)(1) of FECA.1 5
With this legislation, pro-reform advocates are trying to target the
shadowy 527s that they find objectionable, while at the same time
assuaging concerns about infringing on state and local committees, and
fending off claims that this legislation is simply one step closer to push-
ing campaign finance reform deeper down into the Internal Revenue
109. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 180 ("Though there is little legislative history regarding
BCRA generally, and almost nothing on § 323(d) specifically, the abuses identified in the 1998
Senate report regarding campaign finance practices involve the use of nonprofit organizations as
conduits for large soft-money donations.").
110. For a detailed discussion on the evolving standard and specific examples in McConnell,
see Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance After McCain-Feingold: Buckley Is Dead, Long Live
Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31 (2004).
111. S. 271, 109th Cong. (2005).
112. See I.R.C. § 527(i)(5) (2000).
113. See id. § 527(e)(2) (2000).
114. See id. § 527(g) (2000).
115. S. 271 § 2.
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Code towards regulation of 501(c) organizations.' 16 This most recent
round of proposed legislation on campaign finance reform raises some
important questions and concerns that go to the heart of First Amend-
ment associational rights.
For example, to what extent are Americans willing to allow Con-
gress, whose members, some have credibly argued, have a conflict of
interest when it comes to campaign finance and a vested interest in
entrenching themselves and their parties, to continue to impose restric-
tions on associational rights?" 7 Why is it that 501(c) groups may
engage in some issue advocacy that ultimately influences federal elec-
tions, but once such activity is deemed a "major purpose," it becomes
subject to strict source and contribution limitations? Are the disclosure
requirements added in the amendment to section 527 enough to allow
the average American voter to decide which ads are genuine and which
ones are shams? Why are reform advocates so convinced that further
regulation of political associations like 527s will put an end to "cynicism
and apathy" on the part of "average" voters?" 8 After all, what if the
"average" voter just does not care enough about certain issues or candi-
dates to contribute money in any quantity? Why is it wrong for billion-
aires like George Soros to express their disdain for policies and
candidates when there is no good evidence that they are trying to put
politicians in their pockets?
Several legal scholars have attempted to answer these questions.
Proponents of reform point to the "major purpose" test first enunciated
in Buckley and reiterated in McConnell as a rationale for distinguishing
527s, whose self-proclaimed major purpose is to influence elections.' 19
116. Compare 527 Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Robert F. Bauer) ("By empowering the
FEC to determine whether an organization is an IRC § 527 'political organization,' the bill would
surely encourage complaints to the FEC that various organizations, particularly 501(c)s, were
operating as 527s, not as 501(c)s. In light of the reform community's distrust of 501(c) advocacy
and voter mobilization programs, this is not by any means a remote possibility. For organizations
now operating under exemption recognized by the IRS, this is, in fact, a likely and costly effect of
the structure of this proposal." (footnote omitted)), with 527 Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of
Prof. Frances R. Hill) ("The 527 Reform Act of 2005 does not apply to section 501(c)
organizations, as it states explicitly in Section 4(3). This approach reflects the very different tax
predicate of section 527 and section 501(c) .... [T]he IRS will not simply treat [an organization
that does not qualify as a 501(c) because of activities that push the envelope] as an involuntary
section 527 organization.").
117. See, e.g., id. (statement of Robert F. Bauer) ("Also true is the traditional and profound
effect of partisan interest on the choice of which reforms are promoted, and which are not.
Examples range from early Congressional investigations into violations of the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act, through the enactments of the Hatch and Smith-Connolly Acts, and the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971. The pressure for 527 reform, in the wake of the 2004 Presidential
and Congressional elections, is the latest chapter in this partisan history.").
118. See id. (statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold).
119. See, e.g., id. (statement of Scott E. Thomas, FEC Comm'r).
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Others argue that starting with this test is a misinterpretation of Buckley,
and that the correct standard to apply in attempting to define political
committees is the contribution/expenditure test.' 20 Still others involved
in influencing the debate have responded by raising another potential
constitutional challenge to 527 regulation, which emanates from the dis-
tinction in the standards applied to independent expenditures versus con-
tributions (that is, independent expenditures enjoy a higher degree of
associational protection than contributions). The Court has reiterated on
numerous occasions that individuals are free to engage in limitless
expenditures "made totally independently of the candidate and his cam-
paign." 121 These statements by the Court would seem to preclude a con-
stitutional contribution limit on contributions to "independent
expenditure committees. 122
Senator McCain and other Republican reform advocates respond to
this potential constitutional challenge by pointing to a memorandum pre-
pared by Professor Daniel Ortiz, a Professor of Law at the University of
Virginia School of Law.123 In the memorandum, Professor Ortiz relies
on the interplay between the majority judgment and the concurring opin-
ion in California Medical Ass'n v. FEC,1 4 as well as on footnote 48 in
120. See id. (statement of David M. Mason, FEC Comm'r) ("The claim by some that the law
requires the Commission to begin its inquiry with a major purpose analysis and then work
backwards to consider whether an organization whose major purpose is political has made
expenditures or contributions turns the judicial test inside out. It attempts to use a doctrine
enunciated as necessary to limit the reach of the statute into a tool to expand the statute's reach.
In addition, since the Court has held that all spending by political committees is campaign-related,
this approach attempts to short circuit the statutory approach though [sic] expenditures and
contributions by begging those questions: beginning with a 'major purpose' inquiry which is not
mentioned or defined in the statue [sic], and then simply declaring that all or virtually all spending
by a 'major purpose' group is an 'expenditure.' This would make the statute's expenditure
definition, and the statute's use of that term to define political committee, superfluous.").
121. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 221 (2003) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47
(1976)).
122. See 527 Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of David M. Mason, FEC Comm'r) ("Put
practically, if it is OK for George Soros and Peter Lewis each to spend $10 million independently
to defeat President Bush, why is it wrong for the two of them to get together and spend $20
million jointly? Why does combining two rights (those of speech and association) make a wrong?
Both the judicial deference to Congressional findings evidenced in McConnell and Congress' own
independent obligation to the constitution indicate that Congress should, in considering this
legislation, carefully consider whether there is a constitutional impediment to the effective
imposition of a $5,000 contribution limit to [independent expenditure political action committees]
and to present its conclusions and constitutional justification for any proposed limit. Even with
what might appear to be a favorable breeze from McConnell, given the explicit reservation of this
issue by the Supreme Court and the active examination of it in two federal circuits, it would be
shortsighted to fail to address this constitutional question squarely.").
123. See id. (statement of Sen. John McCain) (submitting Professor Ortiz's memorandum for
the record).
124. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
McConnell, 25 to conclude that it is constitutional to limit contributions
to entities that engage solely in independent expenditures: 
12 6
CalMed held that Congress could limit contributions to entities that
would use them solely for independent expenditures. McConnell
then made clear why: CalMed necessarily found that such contribu-
tions pose a danger of actual or apparent corruption .... CalMed,
then, despite its ambivalent dicta, stands for two propositions: (i) that
contributions can corrupt independently of their ultimate use and (ii)
that Congress can limit contributions to political committees that the
recipients would use to make independent expenditures.127
The memorandum, however, does not address how 527 indepen-
dent expenditures are corrupting candidates or why 527s should be clas-
sified as political committees in the first instance, even while
acknowledging that "[t]he contribution's ultimate use did not determine
its corruptive potential. Rather, the corruptive potential stemmed from
the party's ability to give donors access to and influence over its candi-
dates," ' 28 a charge that has yet to be substantiated with respect to 527s.
Furthermore, Professor Ortiz's memorandum has been criticized on a
number of other grounds as well, including the failure to address the
associational rights infringement issue of a $5,000 contribution limit.129
Still others have argued that the reason why George Soros and other
wealthy 527 contributors should be prohibited from making exorbitant
contributions is because such donations lead to control of the electoral
process in a way that "undermines the democratic value of widespread
participation." 130
There is mounting evidence that this latter rationale might be
accepted by the Supreme Court. The Court's reasoning in Buckley for
allowing regulations to infringe upon the associational freedoms impli-
cated in contribution was that, although the contribution ceilings would
"merely . . . require candidates and political committees to raise funds
from a greater number of persons," they would still "leave the contribu-
tor free to become a member of any political association and to assist
125. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 152.
126. Memorandum from Daniel R. Ortiz, John Allan Love Professor of Law, University of
Virginia School of Law, for Democracy 21 and the Campaign Legal Center 3 (Apr. 9, 2005),
available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/Ll14.pdf.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 4.
129. See Posting of Rick Hasen to http://electionlawblog.org/archives/001003.html (Apr. 13,
2004) (arguing that Dan Ortiz's point that "[c]ampaign contributions impose only a marginal
restriction on free speech ... misses the associational issue that comes up not for Soros, but for
those who have more than $5,000 to give, but not enough as Soros to be able to engage in
effective advocacy").
130. Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 73 (2004).
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personally in the association's efforts on behalf of candidates." 13 ' But
while the Buckley Court clung to the contribution/expenditure distinc-
tion, and to the requirement that there be proven corruption before regu-
lations could be imposed, it seems the McConnell Court, and perhaps
Justice Breyer in particular,' 3 2 is moving toward a regulatory justifica-
tion based on a model of "participatory" or "democratic self-govern-
ment"' 33 and "class sensitive" approaches to campaign finance law.' 34
As two leading campaign finance reform analysts have pointed out, this
growing movement is worrisome to those who value associational free-
doms more than any attempt to engage an electorate that may not have
any interest in participating in federal elections beyond effectively exer-
cising their right to vote.' 35
While there are merits to arguments on both sides of the 527
Reform Act, perhaps the best solution is to proceed slowly and to adopt
an approach that recognizes the significance of associational rights while
not being disingenuous or partisan about the potential for corruption.
One such possible solution is that proposed by the Brennan Center for
Justice, which would classify 527s as political committees for the pur-
poses of disclosure and elimination of contributions from corporations
and labor unions, but at the same time would not impose contribution
131. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976).
132. See Hasen, supra note 110, at 31 ("[I1t appears that the Court's jurisprudence is moving in
the direction proposed by Justice Breyer, toward upholding campaign finance laws that promote a
kind of political equality.").
133. See 527 Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Robert F. Bauer) ("In the Court's new view,
Congress need not confine its efforts to addressing demonstrated corruption, or its appearance: it
has constitutional permission to regulate politics in the interest of enriched, more meaningful
democratic self-government.").
134. See Overton, supra note 130, at 78.
135. See Hasen, supra note 110, at 32-33 ("In order to uphold bolder campaign finance laws
purportedly under the Buckley standard, the Court has: (1) reduced the evidentiary burden that the
government must meet to show that a law is necessary to combat corruption or its appearance; (2)
relaxed the level of scrutiny applicable to reviewing campaign finance regulation; and (3)
especially in the McConnell case, engaged in unusually sloppy and incomplete reasoning to justify
its holdings. The result is jurisprudential incoherence and a lead opinion in the most important
campaign finance case in a generation that appears to pay only cursory attention to the First
Amendment interests that must be balanced in evaluating any campaign finance regime."); 527
Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Robert F. Bauer) ("The now seemingly quaint constitutional
concerns expressed by the Buckley Court-about the effect of this kind of regulation on rights of
speech and association-have been subordinated to this goal of participatory self-government.
The goal is grandiose, all the more so because it is undefined; and it is a standing invitation to all
manner of regulation, and there are those determined to regulate the politics who are prepared to
accept the invitation.").
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limitations on individuals when the 527 makes genuinely independent
expenditures. 136
ADRIANA RIvIERE*
136. See Letter from Burt Neuborne, Legal Director, Brennan Center for Justice, to Mai T.
Dinh, Acting Assistant General Counsel, FEC (Apr. 8, 2004) ( letter on file with the University of
Miami Law Review).
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